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Abstract
We propose a simple abstract formalisation of the act of observation,
in which the system and the observer are assumed to be in a pure state
and their interaction deterministically changes the states such that the
outcome can be read from the state of the observer after the interaction.
If the observer consistently realizes the outcome which maximizes the like-
lihood ratio that the outcome pertains to the system under study (and
not to his own state), he will be called Bayes-optimal. We calculate the
probability if for each trial of the experiment the observer is in a new state
picked randomly from his set of states, and the system under investigation
is taken from an ensemble of identical pure states. For classical statistical
mixtures, the relative frequency resulting from the maximum likelihood
principle is an unbiased estimator of the components of the mixture. For
repeated Bayes-optimal observation in case the state space is complex
Hilbert space, the relative frequency converges to the Born rule. Hence,
the principle of Bayes-optimal observation can be regarded as an under-
lying mechanism for the Born rule. We show the outcome assignment
of the Bayes-optimal observer is invariant under unitary transformations
and contextual, but the probability that results from repeated applica-
tion is non-contextual. The proposal gives a concise interpretation for the
meaning of the occurrence of a single outcome in a quantum experiment
as the unique outcome that, relative to the state of the system, is least
dependent on the state of the observe at the instant of measurement.
1 Introduction
As early as 1935, Schro¨dinger wrote: “The rejection of realism has logical con-
sequences. In general, a variable has no definite value before I measure it; then
measuring it does not mean ascertaining the value that it has. But then what
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does it mean?” [28]. As the advent of quantum mechanics solved the long
standing problem of providing an adequate description for several important
and unexplained experiments, the problem of realism in quantum mechanics
was initially perceived mainly as a challenge to the construction of a new phi-
losophy of natural science. In support of this perception, is the fact that almost
all later theoretical advances with experimental consequences came about with-
out any serious progress with this very basic problem. Yet at the same time,
a growing number of people recognized that progress in this problem would
likely have deep consequences for the quantum-classical transition, the attempt
to produce a successful unification of quantum mechanics and relativity theory,
and the related problem of quantum cosmology. Halfway the sixties two im-
portant advances were made. In 1964, John Bell showed that any local hidden
variable theory will yield predictions that are at odds with quantum mechanics.
A few years later, Kochen and Specker [23] presented an explicit set of mea-
surements, for which the simultaneous attribution of values for each of these
measurements, leads to a logical contradiction. The two results can be regarded
as opposite faces of the same coin. Whereas Bell’s result can be verified (or re-
futed) by experiment, Kochen and Specker’s argument shows the problem also
to be a deeply-rooted theoretical one. These two results have been of such im-
portance, that the notion of realism in quantum physics is usually considered
automatically as having either the meaning of ‘locally realistic’ (Bell), or that
of ‘the impossibility of attributing predetermined outcome values to the set of
observables’ (Kochen and Specker). The apparent lack of realism in quantum
mechanics has been illustrated again and again by clever theoretical construc-
tions ranging from Bell-type arguments to impossible coloring games, and the
countless attempts to produce an as loophole free as possible experimental ver-
ification of these arguments 1.
However, the commonly accepted notion that “measuring a variable does
not mean ascertaining the value that it has”, does not mean that the answer
to Schro¨dinger’s question is that the occurrence of a particular outcome has
no meaning. Every proper quantum experiment is a testimony to the contrary,
for if a single outcome has no informational content about the system at all,
then how are we to derive anything at all from the sum of a great number of
informationally empty statements? Whether we perform a tomographic state
reconstruction, or experimentally estimate the value of a physical quantity of a
system, we accept that in a well constructed experiment every outcome presents
a piece of information, a piece of evidence, that brings us closer to the true state
of affairs, whatever that may be. To give a more detailed answer to the question,
1Because local theories, by Bell’s theorem, cannot give rise to some of the experimentally
verifiable predictions of quantum mechanics, the requirement of locality, or so-called “local-
realism” takes a prominent role. However, realism seems more fundamental than locality,
in the sense that the latter is only well-defined if we can attribute some form of reality with
respect to the whereabouts of the system. Moreover, the derivation of the quantum correlation
for most Bell-type experiments do not, at any point, invoke spatial coordinates. As far as
concerns the actual application of quantum theory, it is quite immaterial whether we calculate
the correlations between various outcomes that are obtained in a single location or at space-like
separated locations. Of course, for a locally realistic theory, the difference is huge.
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we are in need of a model that shows how a single outcome is obtained. We will
provide such a model in an attempt to understand the meaning of the occurrence
of a single outcome in a quantum mechanical experiment. More specifically, we
will show that an observer actively seeking to minimize his own influence on the
produced outcome, will, with the aid of Bayesian decision theory, give outcomes
whose relative frequency converges to the Born rule in a natural way. This
in turn will give us a possible interpretation for the occurrence of a particular
outcome.
2 Probabilities of outcomes for a single observ-
able quantity
Let us assume we have a system S for which we write ΣS to denote its set
of states, and A for an observable that can take any single outcome out of n
distinct values in the outcome set X = {x1, . . . , xn}. At the most trivial level,
there is a counting measure on the set of outcomes. If P(X) denotes the set of
all subsets of X , then the probability that a measurement of observable A on
the system in a state ψ ∈ ΣS yields an outcome in a given subset X1 ∈ P(X),
is a mapping
p(.|.) : P(X)× ΣS → [0, 1] (1)
such that for disjoint Xi ∈ P(X), we have:
p(∪Xi|ψ) =
∑
i
p(Xi|ψ) (2)
The additive property described by (2) is generally accepted both in quantum
and classical probability and provides the rationale for the use of normalized
states, that is, states ψ that satisfy:
p(X |ψ) = 1 (3)
In this way, (3) reduces the number of free parameters in state space by one.
We have written p(x|ψ) to emphasize that it represents the probability that the
outcome x obtains when (we know that) the system is prepared in the state
ψ. The classical interpretation for the arisal of probabilities, is one of a lack-
of-knowledge about the precise state being measured. From a naive epistemic
perspective, the outcome x is then an objective attribute of each measured
state, and the probability related to each outcome is simply the fraction of
states having the “x-attribute” in the ensemble of systems that we measure.
As indicated in the introduction, such an interpretation for the probabilities
in quantum mechanics is problematic. Even for a single spin 1/2 particle, one
can show [1] three measurements suffice to exclude such an interpretation, even
without taking recourse to locality issues.
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2.1 Quantum probability for a single observable quantity
In orthodox quantum mechanics, the state space ΣS is the complex Hilbert
space H. The set of states of the observed system that we will consider, is the
set of unit vectors in an n-dimensional Hilbert space Hn,
ΣS = {ψ ∈ Hn : |ψ| = 1} (4)
As usual, the norm |.| is defined through the (sesquilinear) inner product that
we will denote 〈.|.〉. Alternatively, one can take rays or even density operators
for the states. Since both lead to essentially the same results, we will stick to
unit norm vectors. Let L(Hn) be the set of linear operators that act on the
elements of Hn, then an observable A is represented by a self-adjoint element
of L(Hn):
A ∈ L(Hn) : A†= A (5)
Throughout this presentation, we assumeA has a discrete, finite, non-degenerate
spectrum, which implies that eigenvectors belonging to different eigenvalues are
orthogonal. Let FA be the set of the eigenvectors2 of A
FA = {ψi ∈ Hn : A|ψi〉 = ci|ψi〉, ci ∈ R} (6)
We now have 〈ψi|ψj〉 = δi,j and
∑
i |ψi〉〈ψi| = I, and, because the spectrum
is assumed non-degenerate, we have that FA is a basis or a complete orthonormal
frame. From linear algebra we know that an arbitrary element ψs of Hn can be
written in this frame FA as:
|ψs〉 =
n∑
i=1
αi|ψi〉 (7)
If ψs satisfies (3), then it lies in ΣS ⊂ Hn , and the α′s obey:
∑
i
αiα
∗
i = 1 (8)
Moreover, one can easily verify that the observable A can be written as
A =
∑
i
ai|ψi〉〈ψi| (9)
Hence the observable A is in a one-to-one correspondence with an orthonor-
mal frame FA of eigenvectors of A and we will represent the observable by its
associated frame. Throughout this paper, we reserve superscripts of states as
a mnemotechnical aid for system recognition (i.e. ψs is a system state and
ψm the state of the measurement apparatus) and subscripts of states to denote
eigenstates. If a system is in an eigenstate corresponding to outcome xi, we will
2Again, we neglect mathematical details with regard to phase issues and identify all ψ with
the same eigenvalue ci as the same eigenvector ψi.
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denote the corresponding eigenstate as ψi. For an arbitrary eigenstate ψj we
have
p(xi|ψj) = δi,j (10)
Thus for an eigenstate, and also for a statistical mixture of eigenstates, the
classical interpretation of probability as “proportion of system having the x-
attribute” is tenable. The more interesting case, however, is the probability for
the occurrence of an outcome xi when the system is in a general state (7), which
is given by the Born rule:
p(xi|ψs) = |〈ψi, ψs〉|2 = |αi|2 (11)
The analog with the classical situation would be that ψs represents a mixture
of states that have attribute xk in the right proportion such that the Born rule
holds. However the Born rule holds even when the system is in a pure state,
i.e. a state which cannot be obtained as a statistical mixture of states. We
will show that it is possible to regard the probabilities as arising from a lack
of knowledge about the detailed state of the observer if the observer actively
attempts to choose the outcome that maximizes a specific likelihood ratio that
we will present shortly.
3 The process of observation
3.1 The deterministic observer
Let us first define what we mean by an observer. An observer is a physical
system that takes a question as input, and yields in reply an outcome which
is a member of a discrete set. This outcome can be freely copied, and hence
communicated to many other observers. In general, this definition of observer
will include the experimental setup, apparata, sensors, and the human operator.
It is however quite irrelevant to our purposes whether we consider an apparatus
or a detector, an animal or a human being as observer, as long as we agree that it
is this system that has produced the outcome. We will furthermore assume the
observer comes to this outcome through a physical, deterministic interaction.
That is, if we have perfect knowledge of the initial state of the system and of the
potentials that act on the system, we can in principle predict the future state of
the system perfectly. Besides the fact that all fundamental theories of physics
(even classical chaotic systems and quantum dynamics) postulate deterministic
evolution laws, the requirement of determinism allows to derive probability as a
secondary concept. So let us assume that the outcome of an observation is the
result of a deterministic interaction:
τ : ΣS × ΣM → X (12)
Here τ is the interaction rule, ΣS is the set of states of the observed system,
ΣM the set of states of the observing system and X the set of outcomes that
5
observable A can have. We will deal only with a single observable, so no fur-
ther notational reference is made to the particular observable. The mapping τ
encodes how an observer in a state ψm ∈ ΣM , observing a system in the state
ψs ∈ ΣS , comes to the outcome x ∈ X. Because our observer is deterministic,
we assume τ is single-valued. Probability will only arise as a lack of knowledge
on deterministic events. The observer faces the task of selecting an outcome
from the set X that tells something about the system under observation. But
the outcome is always formulated by the observer, it has to be encoded somehow
in the state of the observer after the observation. Hence the outcome itself is
also an observable quantity of the post-measurement state of the observer. The
outcome will then have to share its story among the two participating systems
that gave rise to its existence: it will always have something to say about both
the observer and the system under study. In [6] it was shown by a diagonal
argument, that even in the most simple case of a perfect observer, observing
only classical properties3, there exist classical properties pertaining to himself
that he cannot perfectly observe. More specifically, even if the observer can
observe a given (classical) property perfectly, he cannot perfectly observe that
he observes this classical property perfectly. There is no logical certainty with
respect to faithfulness of a single shot, deterministic observation. On the other
hand, observation is an absolutely indispensable part of doing science, hence
it is only natural that every scientist believes that faithful observation can and
does indeed occur. Living in the real world, somewhere between the extremes of
the ideal and the impossible, we wonder whether there is a strategy for the ob-
server so that he is guaranteed that each outcome he picks uses his observational
powers to the best of his ability.
3.2 Repeated measurement and the randomization of probe
states of the observer
Rather than attempting to measure observables in a single trial of an experi-
ment, our observer turns to a new strategy. First he prepares an ensemble of
a large number of identical system states. Next he will interact with each of
the members of this ensemble in turn. For each and every single interaction,
he will pick the outcome that somehow ‘has the largest likelihood’ of pertaining
to the system. By randomizing his probe state and picking the outcomes in
this way, the observer hopes to restore objectivity, so that he will eventually
obtain information that pertains solely to the system under observation. To
calculate p(x|ψs) within the deterministic setting of the previous section (12)
is in principle straightforward. The experiment our observer will perform is a
3We say the property a of a system S in the state s is actual, iff the testing of property a
for S in the state s, would yield an affirmation with certainty. A property is called classical
when the outcome of the observation to test that property, was predetermined by the state of
the sytem (whatever that state was) prior to the test. For a classical property we can define
a negation in the lattice of properties that is simply the Boolean NOT. A property a is then
classical for S iff for each state of S the property, or its negation, is actual. For details, see
[6].
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repeated one, in which the set of states of the system under study is reduced to
a singleton, and the set of states for the observer is the whole of ΣM . The set of
states for the observer that leads to a given outcome x ∈ X when the observer
observes a system in the state ψs4 will be denoted as eig(x, ψs):
eig(x, ψs) = {ψ ∈ ΣM : τ(ψs, ψ) = x} (13)
From the single-valuedness of τ in (12), we have for xi 6= xj :
eig(xi, ψ
s) ∩ eig(xj , ψs) = 0 (14)
If we assume that the act of observation of an observable leads to an outcome
for every state of the system investigated, we have
∪ni=1eig(xi, ψs) = ΣM (15)
In this way τ defines in a trivial way a partition of the state space of the observer
with each member eig(xi, ψ
s) in the partition belonging to exactly one outcome.
We are now ready to introduce probability. With B(ΣM ) a σ-algebra of Borel
subsets of ΣM , (which we tacitly assume includes eig(xi, ψ
s) for every i), we
define a probability measure µ that acts on the measure space (ΣM ,B(ΣM )).
For any two disjoint σi, σj in B(ΣM ), we have
µ : B(ΣM )→ [0, 1] (16)
µ(σi ∪ σj) = µ(σi) + µ(σj)
µ(ΣM ) = 1
In order to calculate p(x|ψs), we need to evaluate the probability measure
over the set of states for the observer giving rise to the outcome x when they
interact with a state ψs:
p(x|ψs) = µ(eig(x, ψs))/µ(∪ni=1eig(xi, ψs)) (17)
= µ(eig(x, ψs)) (18)
This last formula is fundamental to this paper. It says that for a repeated
experiment on a set of identical pure system states, the probability p(x|ψs) is
given as the ratio of observer states that, given ψs, tell the outcome is x, to the
total number of observer states.
Note that the sets eig(xi, ψ
s) are not sets of eigenvectors in the algebraic
sense of the word5. However, if it happens to be the case that, for a given ψs
and for almost every ψ ∈ ΣM , we have τ(ψs, ψ) = xk in the sense that
µ(eig(xk, ψ
s)) = µ(ΣM ) (19)
4In accordance with the literature on the subject, we used Dirac’s bra-ket notation for our
brief introduction to quantum probability. In what follows we will not make use of the duality
between a Hilbert space and the space of linear functionals on this Hilbert space, so all vectors
are written without brackets.
5The sets (13) are called in eigensets in accordance with [4].
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then, for that particular ψs, we have p(xk|ψs) = 1. The vector ψs thus defined,
will coincide with a regular eigenvector if the state space is a Hilbert space.
The relation between (16) and (1) is through the mapping τ and the measure
µ. It is obvious that (16) is additive in X too
µ(eig(xi, ψ
s) ∪ eig(xj , ψs)) = µ(eig(xi, ψs)) + µ(eig(xj , ψs)) (20)
because of (14). Hence, if the probabilities of (16) and (1) coincide for every
single outcome (the singletons in P(X) ), they will coincide for all of P(X). In
what follows we will therefore restrict our discussion to the probability related
to the occurrence of a single outcome. In conclusion, the success of the pro-
gram to model the probabilities in quantum mechanics as coming from a lack
of knowledge about the precise state of the observer stands or falls with the
question of defining a natural mapping τ (which determines the outcome and
hence eig(x, ψs) ) such that the measure µ of the eigenset eig(xi, ψ
s) pertaining
to outcome xi is identical with the probability obtained by the Born rule (11).
3.3 The Bayes-optimal observer
We can see from (17) that the system state ψs can be associated with a proba-
bility in a fairly trivial way: the probability of an outcome x when the system is
in a pure state ψs, is the proportion of observer states that attribute outcome x
to that state. Even for a repeated measurement on a set of identical pure states,
fluctuations in the outcomes can arise if there is a lack of knowledge concerning
the precise state of the observer. Suppose now the observer, considered as a
system in its own right, is in a state ψm. Then in exactly the same way we can
associate a probability with that state too. The operational meaning of this
association is given either by a secondary observer observing an ensemble of ob-
servers in the state ψm, or by the observer consistently (mis)identifying his own
state ψm for a state of the system ψs. We have argued that every outcome will
say something about the observer, (that is, about ψm), and something about
the system (that is, about ψs). The problem is that this information is mixed
up in a single outcome. Some outcomes will contain more information about
the state of the system, and some more about the state of the apparatus. Even-
tually, we, as operators of our detection apparatus, will have to decide whether
we will retain a given outcome, or reject it. Such decisions are a vital part
of experimental science. For example, an outcome that is deemed too far off
the limit (so-called outliers), is rejected and hence excluded in the subsequent
analysis. The rationale for this exclusion is that an outlier does not contain
information about the system we seek to investigate, but rather that it repre-
sents a peculiarity of the measurement. In practice, rejection or acceptance of
an outcome does not depend on a rational analysis, but on the common sense
and expectations of the experimenter. Suppose however, that the observer does
have absolute knowledge about the state of the system ψs and his own state
ψm, and recognizes the fact that the outcome he delivers may eventually be re-
jected. The observer considers this rejection to be based on the following binary
8
hypotheses:
H0 : the outcome xi was inferred from ψ
s (21)
H1 : the outcome xi was inferred from ψ
m
In full, the hypotheses should actually read: “The outcome xi yields as a
consequence of the observer attributing the state ψs (or ψm) to the system”.
To combat rejection, the observer chooses the outcome that maximizes the like-
lihood that H0 prevails, as if the outcome he delivers will eventually be judged
for acceptance or rejection by one with absolute knowledge about ψs and ψm.
If, in an experiment, it is possible with (non-vanishing probability) to get an
outcome xi under either hypothesis, then a factual occurrence of this outcome
in an experiment supports both hypotheses simultaneously. What really mat-
ters in deciding between H0 and H1 on the basis of a single outcome, is not the
probability of the correctness of each hypothesis itself, but rather whether one
hypothesis has become more likely than the other as a result of getting outcome
xi. From Bayesian decision theory [21], we have that all the information in
the data that is relevant for deciding between H0 and H1, is contained in the
so-called likelihood ratios or, in the binary case, the odds Λi:
Λi =
p(xi|ψs)
p(xi|ψm) , i = 1, . . . , n (22)
In this last formula, the numerator and denominator are given by (17). We are
now in position to state our proposed strategy for the Bayes-optimal observer.
Definition 1 (Bayes-optimal observer) We call a system M in a state ψm
a Bayes-optimal observer iff, after an interaction with a system in a state ψs,
the state of M will transform to a state that expresses the outcome xi that
corresponds to the maximal likelihood ratio Λi (22).
Picking the outcome xi from X that maximizes the corresponding likelihood
ratio Λi, is simply optimizing the odds for H0, given his information. This
concludes our description of the observer. To see what probability arises for a
repeated experiment when an observer is Bayes-optimal, we need a state space.
We are especially interested in complex Hilbert space, but we will first have a
look at statistical mixtures.
3.4 The Bayes-optimal observer for statistical mixtures
If the conditional probabilities p(xi|ψs) are well-defined (which we will just
accept for now), we can make a summary of them in a single vector x(ψs) :
x(ψs) =
n∑
i=1
p(xi|ψs)xi (23)
First we define the convex closure of a number of elements a1, . . . , an ∈ A, :
[a1, . . . , an] = {a ∈ Rn : a =
∑
λiai, 0 ≤ λi ∈ R,
∑
λi = 1} (24)
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If we write [C], as we shortly will, we mean the convex closure of the elements
in C. The standard (n− 1) simplex ∆n−1 generated by the outcome set X is:
∆n−1(X) = [x1, . . . , xn] (25)
We see from (23), (19) that x(ψs) belongs to ∆n−1(X). By identification of
the axes of Rn with the members of X, we have ∆n−1(X) ⊂ Rn(X), the free
vector space generated by the outcome set X . Vectors like x(ψs) are often called
‘statistical states’ or ‘mixtures’ in the literature. Suppose now that all we can or
care to know about the system S and the observerM , are the statistical states,
i.e. the probabilities related to the outcomes of a single experiment. Within
this constraint, the vector x(ψs) represents all there is to know about S and the
state spaces ΣS and ΣM reduce to ∆n−1(X) :
ΣS = ΣM = ∆n−1(X) (26)
Having identified ψs with x(ψs) in this particular case, the conditional prob-
ability p(x1|x(ψs)) denotes the probability that outcome x1 occurs when our
knowledge about the system is encoded in the statistical state x(ψs) :
x(ψs) = p(x1|x(ψs))x1 + . . .+ p(xn|x(ψs))xn (27)
In this section 〈, 〉 denotes the standard inner product in Euclidean space, and
with 〈xi, xj〉 = δij , we have from this last equation
p(xi|x(ψs)) = 〈x(ψs), xi〉 (28)
For a statistical state, the magnitude of the ith coordinate equals the probability
of outcome xi. We have a state space (25), and we have a rule to extract a
probability from a state (28), so we can characterize the sets eig(xk,x(ψ
s)). Let
x(ψs) and x(ψm) be arbitrary states in ∆n−1(X), written as:
x(ψs) =
n∑
i=1
tixi (29)
x(ψm) =
n∑
i=1
rixi
By the definition of Bayes-optimal observation, we have that the outcome xk is
chosen, if for all j 6= k, the corresponding likelihood ratio’s satisfy Λk > Λj . By
(22) and (23), xk is chosen, iff for all j = 1, . . . , n (j 6= k), we have:
p(xk|x(ψs))
p(xk|x(ψm)) >
p(xj |x(ψs))
p(xj |x(ψm)) (30)
The regions eig(xk,x(ψ
s)), are found by substitution of (29) in (28) and then
into (30). With j = 1, . . . , n; j 6= k, we obtain:
eig(xk,x(ψ
s)) = {x(ψm) ∈ ∆n−1 : tk
rk
>
tj
rj
} (31)
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According to (17), the probability of the outcome x for the repeated experiment
on a set of identical system states, is the ratio of observer states that tell the
outcome is x, to the total number of observer states. Because the state space
is Euclidean, it is natural to take for µ the (n− 1)-Lebesgue measure in ∆n−1,
assumed to be normalized: µ(∆n−1(X)) = 1. The probability pBO(xk|x(ψs))
that the Bayes-optimal observer obtains the outcome xk is then given by
pBO(xk|x(ψs)) = µ(eig(xk,x(ψs))) (32)
However, because of the way we defined the statistical state, the probability is
also given directly by components of the state. So the question is whether the
Bayes-optimal observer (32) can recover that probability, i.e. is it true that (32)
equals (28):
µ(eig(xk,x(ψ
s))) = 〈x(ψs), xi〉 (33)
To see if this is the case, we first define the open convex closure of a number of
elements x1, . . . , xn ∈ Rn as
]x1, . . . , xn[= {x ∈ Rn : x =
∑
λixi, 0 < λi ∈ R,
∑
λi = 1} (34)
We can now characterize eig(xk,x(ψ
s)) for the statistical state as being ‘almost
equal’ to
Csk =]x1, . . . , xk−1,x(ψ
s), xk+1, . . . , xn[ (35)
A graphical representation of the eigensets in the simplex state space can be
found in Figure (1).
Lemma 2 Let Csk be defined as in (35), [C
s
k] be the convex closure of C
s
k, and
eig(xk,x(ψ
s)) by (31), then:
Csk ⊂ eig(xk,x(ψs)) ⊂ [Csk]
The proof of this lemma can be found in appendix A. To obtain the prob-
ability (32), we calculate the µ−measure of [Csk], which is simply the (n − 1)-
dimensional volume of the simplex [Csk].
Lemma 3 If µ is a (probability) measure such that µ(∆n−1(X)) = 1, and Csk
is defined by the convex closure of (35), then we have µ([Csk]) = tk
One can calculate of the volume of a simplex straightforwardly by deter-
minant calculus, as was done in [2]. For completeness, we have included an
alternative in the form of a simple geometric argument in appendix B. We then
easily obtain:
Theorem 4 µ(eig(xk, ψ
s)) = tk
Proof. By the first lemma, we have Csk ⊂ eig(xk,x(ψs)) ⊂ [Csk]. Because
A ⊂ B =⇒ µ(a) ≤ µ(B) we have
µ(Csk) ≤ µ(eig(xk,x(ψs))) ≤ µ([Csk])
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Figure 1: Illustration of the scheme in the simplex state space. We start with
the discrete outcome set, depicted in figure (a). The state space for an outcome
set with three outcomes, is the standard 2-simplex in the free vector space
generated by the outcome set over the field of real numbers, as depicted in
picture (b). In figure (c), we see the eigensets Csk, so we can see what outcome
will be obtained from a Bayes-optimal measurement. An apparatus state picked
from the darkest region, Cs2 , will lead to the outcome x2, in the lightest region,
Cs1 , to x1, and the intermediately shaded region, C
s
3 , leads to the outcome x3.
The probability is the Lebesgue measure over the depicted eigensets. I.e., the
probability of obtaining the outcome x2, is the normalized area of the darkest
triangle.
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Figure 2: A graphical exposition of the contextuality of the outcome assignment.
(a) If we pick an observer state from the open white triangle ]ψs, x2, x3[, then
a measurement of the state ψs will yield outcome x1. (b) If we interchange the
second and third component of ψs, we obtain ψs1. The probability of obtaining
outcome x1 is the same as in picture (a), because the two triangles have the
same area. However, an observer state choosen from the black shaded region
would yield outcome x1 in picture (a), whereas it would yield x2 in picture (b).
Note that we did not change the x1 component in the state ψ
s to obtain ψs1.
By the second lemma we have µ([Csk]) = tk. To calculate µ(C
s
k), we note that
µ(Csk) = µ([C
s
k])−µ([Csk]∩Csk). Because [Csk]∩Csk is the collection of faces of Csk,
a set of finite cardinality whose members have an affine dimension maximally
equal to n − 2, it is µ−negligible, hence we also have µ(Csk) = tk, establishing
the result.
We see that indeed the Bayes-optimal observer recovers the probability that
was encoded in the statistical state:
pBO(xk|x(ψs)) = tk = p(xk|x(ψs))
In this way the observer succeeds in obtaining a quantity that, in the limit
of infinite measurements, depends only on the state of the system under investi-
gation, and not on his own state. The results we have obtained for the simplex
state space are identical to those in [2], where the scheme was proposed under
the name “hidden measurements” to indicate the origin of the lack of knowl-
edge. In [2] the eigensets are postulated ad hoc, whereas we have derived their
simplicial shape from the principle of Bayes-optimal observation. We will use
this principle in the next section to extend the results of [2] to systems with a
complex state space.
Before we do so, two remarks are in order. First, we did not specify whether
the state x(ψs) is the result of mixing ‘pure’ components with appropriate
weights, as indicated by the components of the state, or whether it represents
a statistical tendency, somewhat like a propensity, of an ensemble of identical
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‘pure’ states to reveal itself in the different outcomes. That is, if all we are
allowed to do is perform a single experiment on each member of the ensemble,
then from the resulting statistics of a single observable, we cannot distinguish
between these two situations. In other words, if we have an urn filled with coins
and we are allowed to inspect the coin only after a single throw of the coin, for
every coin in the urn, then we cannot know whether it is a tendency of the coin
to show heads with probability 1/2, or whether half of the coins have both sides
heads and half of them have both sides tails (or indeed a mixture of these two
situations). Secondly, it is interesting that, even for the conceptually simple sta-
tistical mixtures, the outcome assignment given by the Bayes-optimal observer
is contextual in the following sense: given a state for the observer and system
that lead to the outcome xl, then the mere interchanging of the coefficients tj
and tk (equal to the probability for the outcomes xj and xk) can easily result in
a different outcome than xl, even if neither xj , nor xk is equal to xl! This can
readily be verified in Figure (2). However, the probability p(xi|x(ψs)) of the
outcome is a function of ti only, hence the probability itself is non-contextual.
Conversely, given a state of an observer ψm and a system state ψs that inter-
act to yield the outcome xk, it is often possible to change the outcome of the
Bayes-optimal observer to a different outcome by interchanging suitable coeffi-
cients of the observer, leaving rk untouched. This means that changing only the
observer’s preferences over the outcomes xj and xl, may let the Bayes-optimal
observer decide another outcome than xk is more optimal, even if j, l and k
are all different! This contextual aspect of the outcome assignment can here
be understood as a result of the inescapable bias introduced by the state of
the observer in producing a single outcome, for the coefficients of his state rep-
resent his tendencies for each outcome6. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, it
is precisely through the averaging procedure over all the different possibilities
for this bias, that a non-contextual probability emerges. From Figure (2) we
see that the contextuality of the outcome assignment depends on the classical
entropy of the state. According to a well-known theorem due to Shannon, the
higher the entropy of the state ψs, the closer the coefficients of ψs in (23) are
to 1/n and the closer this state will reside near the centre of the simplex, effec-
tively limiting the possibilities for producing a contextual outcome change by
interchanging coefficients.
3.5 Bayes-optimal observation in complex Hilbert space
Complex Hilbert spaces are of considerable interest as they arise naturally in
many prominent scientific areas including quantum theory, signal analysis (both
in time-frequency and in wavelet analysis), electromagnetism and electronic
networks7, and the more recently founded shape theory [22]. The natural setting
6This tendency could be revealed if we fix the state of the observer and observe (by means
of a second observer)the relative frequencies for the outcomes he produces when he measures
members of an ensemble of randomly choosen states.
7Interestingly, the name probability amplitude, and indeed the Born interpretation of the
wave vector in quantum mechanics, were conceived by Born in analogy with electromagnetic
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for the discrete state space in these examples, is the space of square summable
functions on a Hilbert spaceHn(C) over the field of complex numbers. A general
state of the system ψs ∈ ΣS = Hn(C) can then be written as:
ψs =
n∑
i=1
qixi (36)
where qi ∈ C and |ψs| = 1. In this case the outcome set X consists of an
orthonormal frame of complex vectors {xi}. An observer (or a detector, which
is quite the same for our purposes) usually has a very large number of internal
degrees of freedom. Accordingly it lives in a Hilbert space of appropriately high
dimensionality. However, by the Schmidt bi-orthogonal decomposition theorem,
we know we can model every possible interaction between two systems, one living
in a Hilbert space of dimension n and one in a Hilbert space of dimension m
with m > n, by an interaction of two systems, each one living in a Hilbert space
of dimension n. With this in mind, we model the set of states of the observer
as unit vectors in Hn:
ΣM = {ψ ∈ Hn(C) : |ψ| = 1}
The reader should take note of the fact that, every time we speak about
“the state of the observer”, we mean the state in the subspace indicated by the
Schmidt bi-orthogonal decomposition theorem. The state of the observer, to us,
always means only that part of the state that is of relevance to the production of
the outcome. This is especially relevant for the interpretation of sentences such
as “uniform distribution of initial observer states”, which taken too literally,
would indicate the observer is perhaps doing something completely different
than observing. The state of an observer with respect to an experiment with
outcome set X can be written as (ri ∈ C)
ψm =
n∑
i=1
rixi (37)
Because the coefficients now assume complex values, they cannot be interpreted
as probabilities because we do not have a total order relation in the field of
complex numbers. This difference also affects the deeper, deterministic level of
the description in a profound way. Let us explain why this is the case. For the
statistical states of the former section, each eigenset is a subsimplex of the state
space. A simplex is a (very) special case of a convex set. Because the eigensets
share at most a lower dimensional face, any two different eigensets (for a fixed
system state) can be separated8 by a single hyperplane. But in a complex
waves. Here the norm is not unity, but equal to the energy in the wave, and probability
conservation is replaced by conservation of energy.
8If C1 and C2 are two sets in Rn, then a hyperplane H is said to separate C1 and C2 iff
C1 is contained in one of the closed halfspaces associated with H and C2 lies in the opposite
closed half-space. Two convex sets in Rn that share at most an affine set of dimension n− 1,
can be separated by a hyperplane.
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space a hyperplane does not separate that space in two half-spaces. To apply
the criterion of Bayes-optimality, one needs to decomplexify the space to restore
the order relation, but this can be done in a variety of ways. On the other hand,
this plurality of decomplexifications need not bother us too much. Just as in
the case of the statistical states of the former section, the observer can check the
statistical validity of his outcome assignment by verifying that the probability
(in the sense of a relative frequency) that results from repeated application of his
outcome assignment, equals the assumed probability. In the same way, we can
simply postulate, or even guess, a specific form of the probability assignment
and justify it a posteriori : If the relative frequency of an outcome (as a result
of the observers’ outcome assignment, based on the Bayes-optimal condition),
converges to a limit that yields (a monotone function of) the very probability
assignment he used to obtain those outcomes, the Bayes-optimal observer knows
he was Bayes-optimal. Let us attempt a minimal generalization of the real case
(31), with ψs and ψm defined as in (36), (37) and j = 1, . . . , n; j 6= k:
eigC(xk, ψ
s) = {ψm ∈ ΣM : |qk||rk| >
|qj |
|rj | } (38)
The only difference with (31), is that we take the modulus of the coefficients and
that the set contains complex vectors, which is why we have given the eigenset
the superscript C. To check the consistency of our Bayes-optimal observer in
the complex state space, we evaluate the Lebesgue measure ν(eigC(xk, ψ
s)).
Therefore we regard the measure ν in Cn as the Lebesgue measure µ over R2n.
The calculation of the measure by direct integration can be avoided by use of a
mapping ω that preserves measures. A measurable mapping ω between measure
spaces (Σ,A, µ) and (Σ,B, ν) is called a measure-preserving mapping if, for every
B ∈ B, we have µ(ω−1(B)) = ν(B). In appendix C we demonstrate that the
component-wise (or Haddamard) product of a complex vector with its complex
conjugate, that sends elements of the complex unit-sphere Sn = {z ∈ Cn :∑n
i=1 ziz
∗
i = 1} onto the (n − 1) -simplex ∆n−1 = {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1} is
indeed measure preserving in this sense. We have given a graphic representation
of the action of ω in Figure (3). We are now in a position to prove our main
result.
Theorem 5
p(xk|ψs) = |〈xk, ψs〉|2
Proof. With eigC(xk, ψ
s) defined by (38), and
Csk =]ω(x1), . . . , ω(xk−1), ω(ψ
s), ω(xk+1), . . . , ω(xn)[,
it is straightforward to show that (for more details, see [5]) we have:
Csk ⊂ ω(eigC(xk, ψs)) ⊂ [Csk]
Let µ˜ and ν˜ stand for the normalized versions of the measures µ and ν in
the proof in appendix C, so that their constant of proportionality equals one:
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Figure 3: The action of the mapping ω sends elements of the unit sphere to the
standard simplex (upper figure). The probability for the occurrence of outcome
xk is the measure of the eigenset corresponding to outcome xk and is calculated
in the simplex using the measure preserving mapping ω. The eigensets are
depicted in the lower figure for the simplex; it is not possible to show graphically
what these sets look like in the complex unit sphere.
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ν˜(ω−1(A)) = µ˜(A). By definition p(xk|ψs) = ν˜(eigC(xk, ψs)), and by the previ-
ous lemma, we have
ν˜(eigC(xk, ψ
s)) = ν˜(ω−1(Csk))
= µ˜(Csk)
The normalized measure µ˜(Csk) of the real simplex C
s
k was calculated in the real
state space. A completely equivalent calculation gives us
µ˜(Csk) = 〈ω(xk), ω(ψs)〉 = |qk|2
= |〈xk, ψs〉|2
We see that indeed the Bayes-optimal observer recovers the Born rule as a
result of his attempt to maximize the odds with respect to the outcome that
pertains to the system. To be precise, we did not maximize the odds, because
substitution of the Born rule for the probability in (22) gives:
Λk =
|〈xk, ψs〉|2
|〈xk, ψm〉|2 =
|qk|2
|rk|2 (39)
Whereas our observer, by (38), calculated the ratio’s:
Λ˜k =
|qk|
|rk| (40)
where the tilde denotes the fact that, strictly speaking, this is not a likeli-
hood, because |qk| and |rk| aren’t probabilities (they are square roots of prob-
abilities). Yet, it is obvious that the value of k for which (39) and (40) are
maximal, is the same because one is the square of the other, which is clearly a
monotone function. As a consequence, it does not matter if the Bayes-optimal
observer works with (39) or with (40): repeated application of either strategy
on the same pure state will make the relative frequency converge to the Born
rule in exactly the same way in both cases.
4 Consequences of Bayes-optimal observation
4.1 Decision invariance and unitarity
The outcome chosen by a Bayes-optimal observers, is the one that maximizes
the corresponding likelihood ratio Λi. Any monotonously increasing function of
the likelihood ratio’s preserves their relative order, and hence their maximum.
By (31) and (38), this carries over to the coefficients of the state vectors in both
the real and the complex state space. The same is true for multiplication by
a phase factor, which is cancelled by taking the moduli in (38). As a result,
the state space is not only a vector space, it is a projective vector space: if
the vectors in the state space are multiplied z ∈ C, 0 < |z| < ∞, this does
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not change the result of the decision procedure adopted by the Bayes-optimal
observer. There is another interesting class of transformations that leaves the
Bayes-optimal decision unaltered. For any ψs, the probability of xk is defined
as:
p(xk|ψs) = µ(eigC(xk, ψs))
Because ω(eigC(xk, ψ
s)) ⊂ [Csk], ω continuous, and because the elements of [Csk]
have finite norm, the norm of the vectors in eigC(xk, ψ
s) is finite too. We can
then apply a linear transformation to the base vectors of the state space:
T : ΣS → ΣS (41)
T (xj) =
n∑
i
σijxj
The eigenset eigC(xk, ψ
s) will accordingly be transformed by applying T to
xk and ψ
s. By Lebesgue measure theory, the volume of the transformed set is
proportional to the volume of the original set, the constant of proportionality
being the determinant of the transformation:
µ(T (eigC(xk, ψ
s))) = | det(T )|µ(eigC(xk, ψs))
for all eigC(xk, ψ
s) ∈ B(Σ). This is a classic result9, and we refer the interested
reader to ([26], p54) for a proof. Note that this would typically be untrue for
a nonlinear transformation. As a result, all transformations with | det(T )| = 1
leave the probabilities invariant, which means we have invariance under unitary
transformations. Intuitively this is obvious: if the probabilities have their origin
in a measure on state space, then scaling, phase shifting, forming the mirror
image, or ‘rotating’ the entire state space, does not alter the relative proportions
of the eigensets, hence the invariance. Of course, it is easy to derive from the
Born rule that the probabilities are invariant under unitary transformations,
because the Born rule is the square modulus of an inner product and a unitary
transformation can be defined as a linear operator that leaves the inner product
invariant. Our invariance principle tells us the same story at a deeper level, for
not only the probabilities are invariant under unitary transformation, but also
each obtained outcome will be the same whether or not we unitarily transform
the eigensets.
4.2 The elusive quantum to classical transition
Suppose we have a particular statistical mixture
ϕ = ξψ1 + (1 − ξ)ψ2 (42)
of two (pure) states ψ1 and ψ2 with ξ ∈]0, 1[. Suppose furthermore that
p(xi|ψ1) = q1
p(xi|ψ2) = q2
9As before, we regard the complex n−space as a real 2n−space, for which the theorem is
applicable.
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Then an observing system is said to satisfy the linear mixture property iff
p(xi|ϕ) = ξq1 + (1− ξ)q2 (43)
In words: the probability of a mixture equals the mixture of the probabilities.
Does the Bayes-optimal observer satisfy the linear mixture property? Well, ϕ is
a statistical mixture, as defined in the section on Bayes-optimal observation of
statistical mixtures, and each of the constituents in the mixture is a pure state,
as defined in the section Bayes-optimal observation in Hilbert space. So clearly,
our Bayes-optimal observer satisfies the linear mixture property. In essence, this
stems from his initial states being uniformly random (almost everywhere). In-
deed, suppose the distribution of the initial states of the observer is not uniform
a.e.. Then one can always find a convex region S in state space with surface
measure A, for which the density of observer states is not equal to 1/A.Without
giving a formal proof, one can see that, it is always possible to find two states
ψ1, ψ2 /∈ S and a real number ξ ∈]0, 1[, such that ξψ1 + (1 − ξ)ψ2 ∈ S and for
which the linear mixture property will be violated.
The linear mixture property is essential to experimental observation: no
experimenter would put his faith in the hands of a detection apparatus that
manifestly fails this most basic requirement. From this perspective, the diffi-
culty of finding an intermediate region between the classical and the quantum,
originates from the lack of a principle that determines how the observer should
behave in order to objectively observe the intermediate region in absence of the
linear mixture property. As an example, suppose we want to determine the
length of a linearly extend system. In a classical setting, we are in principle free
to choose the number of outcomes, and we are allowed to make many observa-
tions before we settle on the result of a single measurement. For example, we
can align the zero of the measuring rod with one end point of the system and
read the outcome at the other end point as many times as we want to. If we
are not satisfied with the precision that the measuring rod affords, we can pick
a better one, or improve it by adding a nonius (or vernier) system to it. As
long as we are able to do this, we are still in a classical regime of observation.
In the classical regime of observation, the distribution of observer states will be
highly non-uniform. Ideally, of all possible measurements, the only uncertainty
we have about the state of the observer that is assumed to be of relevance to the
measurement outcome, is an uncertainty of the order of the smallest number the
measuring rod can represent. To decrease the uncertainty about the result, even
beyond the precision offered by the smallest number the rod can represent, it is
common scientific practice to perform the measurement many times. Assuming
identical, independent observations, one can apply standard error theory. In
the beginning of the eighties, Wootters has shown ([32], [33]), using standard
error theory, that the distance (angle) between two states on the unit sphere in
(real) Hilbert space, is proportional to the number of maximally discriminating
observations along the geodesic between those two points. This beautiful result
gains in richness when considered from the point of view that the probabilities
arise in a Bayes-optimal way. In our search for ever more precise measurements
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or measurements on ever smaller constituents of nature, we eventually reach a
region where we cannot repeat measurements without absorbing the system or
altering its state. We may not even be able to choose freely the set of outcomes
for a particular measurement, as is the case in the quantum regime. It is then
no longer possible to directly obtain the “true” value of a physical quantity, be-
cause the eigenstate of the observing system may not (and in general will not)
coincide with the state of the system under investigation. We cannot attempt
the same measurement (or one with altered eigenstates) on the same system,
because the state of the system has been altered, or even destroyed. In view of
this impossibility, we are led to statistical observation on ensembles. We have
shown it is possible to recover an objective probability if the distribution of
observer states is uniform. We see that the best possible observation scheme in
the classical regime entails a minimal uncertainty (i.e. about the interpretation
of the last digit only) in the state of the observer, and in the quantum regime
a maximal uncertainty (any outcome is in principle possible) about the state of
the observer. The consequence of such an interpretation is, that we will only be
able to identify intermediate regions when we allow for a more complete descrip-
tion of the observing system. In essence, we need to describe how to go from
this minimal to this maximal uncertainty state. There are good reasons for cau-
tiously entering this intermediate region. Some of the beautiful properties of the
classical and the quantum regime will not hold. For example, the linear mixture
property cannot be universally satisfied. Moreover, we will obtain probability
distributions that depend not only on the system, but at least partially on the
dynamics of the observing system. It is possible to construct explicit models
that show [4] one can identify an intermediate region where the probabilities
satisfy neither the classical statistical Bonferroni inequalities10 indicating the
absence of a straightforward Kolmogorovian model, nor the Accardi-Fedullo in-
equalities [1] that constrain the set of probabilities that are derivable from a
Hilbert space model. This opens up a whole new area of investigation, but only
if we are willing to take the bold step of abandoning the full generality of the
linear mixture property.
4.3 Is the Bayes-optimal observer objective?
The purpose of objective observation is to obtain a probability for the outcome
that depends only on the system under study. How fast the sequence of outcomes
converges to this probability, depends on how well the observer manages to
distinguish his state from the state of the system under study. This aspect was
neglected in the previous discussion. If we apply the Born rule to calculate the
quantities p(xi|H0) and p(xi|H1), we imply that
∑
i p(xi|H0) =
∑
i p(xi|H1) =
1. However, if the choice betweenH0 andH1 is indeed a binary decision problem,
10The Bonferroni inqualities indicate when a set of (joint) probabilities can be derived from
a Kolmogorovian probability model. The best known example of a Bonferroni inequality in
the foundations of quantum mechanics, is the Bell inequality.
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we should have:
∑
i
p(xi|H0) = α (44)
∑
i
p(xi|H1) = 1− α
The reason why this is not contradictory, is because the observer chooses
his outcome, as if the outcome will be judged afterwards as a binary decision
problem. The observer himself has a priori no clue what the value of α might
be. But even if he would estimate the value of α after repeated measurements,
then still this knowledge cannot not help him to give a more optimal outcome.
To the Bayes-optimal observer, knowledge of α would merely have the effect
of scaling the odds in (22) by 1−α
α
. The choice of the outcome for the Bayes-
optimal observer is based on the maximal likelihood and a monotone function
of the likelihoods will not change the maximum. Thus we see that the specific
value of α has no influence on the actual choice. If µ is truly uniform, then,
the resulting relative frequency will converge to the Bayes-optimal probability
that only depends on the state of the system, whatever value α happens to
have in practice. However, a small value of α implies that for each outcome, the
probability that the outcome depends on the state of the system, is small. So the
expected increase in information about the system as a result of obtaining that
outcome, is small too. Evidently this will extend the number of measurements
needed to acquire information about the system. We see that α is a crude
statistical measure for the objectivity of the observer. It represents his ability
to separate interior from exterior. It turns out we can always pick an outcome
that supports H0 more than it supports H1 iff α > 1/2. To see this, we proceed
ad absurdum. If no outcome supports H0 more than it supports H1, then for
all xj ,
p(xj |H0)
p(xj |H1) ≤ 1
But then11 we have: ∑n
j p(xj |H0)∑n
j p(xj |H1)
≤ 1, (45)
which implies α ≤ 1 − α. We obtain the contradiction iff α > 1/2. In words: if
we can do only slightly better than completely arbitrary in letting the outcome
probability depend on the system, we can guarantee the existence of an outcome
that maximizes the odds and is greater than unity. In fact, for any value of α
we can find an (almost always unique) outcome that maximizes the odds, but
11This specific condition is known in the literature as majorization. It plays an important
role in the investigation of bipartite state conversions by local operations and classical commu-
nications (LOCC). This may seem relevant in connection to our problem, as the basic scheme
we present can be described as a bipartite state conversion problem. However, we cannot use
the many interesting results in the literature on bipartite state conversion because LOCC’s in
this particular problem are operationally defined by means of local unitary transformations
and a local measurement, and it is the local measurement that we seek to understand!
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when α > 1/2, the maximal likelihood ratio enjoys the property of being greater
than one.
4.4 The Bayes-optimal observer as a paradigm for obser-
vation
The proposed principle of observation is based on a Bayesian treatment of a
binary decision problem, but is not used in its usual decision-theoretic form. In
decision theory we seek to establish which of the hypotheses enjoys the strongest
support in evidence of the data. In our case, there is no data to feed the
likelihood with, because we produce the data by means of the odds. The way
we employ the principle is like an inverse decision problem, as if anticipating
that the result will be judged afterwards by a decision procedure performed
by one with absolute knowledge of the system and observer states prior to the
measurement. The possibility of applying Bayesian decision theory in quantum
mechanics came to me through the realization that the criterion established by
Aerts D. at the end of [2] to characterize the so-called hidden measurements, is
a monotone function of the Bayesian odds and hence leads to the same choice
for the outcome. In this sense, this paper can be seen as providing a Bayesian
foundation for the structure of the hidden measurements as given in, for example
[2] and [3], and extending the results to the complex Hilbert space.
More recently it has come to my attention that a somewhat similar paradigm
(without reference to quantum mechanics) is proposed in several papers that
deal with visual perception by humans. The idea that the visual system is
rooted in inference, can be traced back to the work of Helmholtz [20], who
proposed the notion of unconscious inference. It was only in the last decade
that it was accepted and translated into a mathematical framework, not in the
least because computer scientists who want to model the human vision system
are faced with the apparent complexity that underlies human perception. The
Bayesian framework provides the tools necessary to understand and explain a
wide variety of sometimes baffling visual illusions that occur in human percep-
tion [19]. In retrospect, we have borrowed the term ‘Bayes-optimal’ from this
literature, because the term so neatly describes the principle and it did not seem
appropriate to introduce a new term. There are however some differences in the
application of the principle with respect to our proposal. In the literature on
visual perception, the prior distributions are derived from real world statistics.
Of course, this begs the question how these prior distributions were obtained
in the first place. There are two basic possibilities to obtain a prior: either a
prior distribution is based on some theoretical assumption, or it is established
by looking at the relative frequency of actual recordings. The first option is
the one we pursued in this article, where we assumed a uniform distribution of
observer states12. In the second case, which is the one adopted in the literature
on perception, one has the advantage of being able to explain a wide variety of
12The absence of a more informative prior distribution effectively reduces the criterion of
Bayes-optimality to a Neyman-Pearson maximum-likelihood criterion.
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visual effects in human perception, and how the priors can be adapted through
the use of Bayesian updating, but we cannot explain observation itself. The
relative frequency needed to obtain the prior, is rooted in the observation of
data, which requires another prior and so on ad infinitum. One can break from
this loop by reconsideration of what a state is. In the literature on perception
states are considered only as (real) statistical mixtures, severely limiting both
the applicability and the philosophical scope of the paradigm. The state, as we
have defined it here, can be a complex vector, not obtainable as a mixture in
principle, and yet give rise to probabilities if we attempt to observe it as good
as possible. So the state is simultaneously a description of the ‘mode of being’
(the pure state that physically interacts), and a ‘catalogue of information’ (the
probabilities the Bayes-optimal observer obtains).
The possibility that the same principle governs human perception and quan-
tum mechanical observation, strengthens the Bayes-optimal paradigm. Mea-
surement apparata and human perception can be rooted in the same principle:
the attempt to relate the outcome to the object under investigation as unam-
biguously as possible by choosing the outcome that has the largest odds (22).
By repeating the observation many times, each time randomizing the internal
state of the sensor, we obtain an invariant of the observation that pertains solely
to the system.
Another interesting link with the existing literature was pointed out to me
by Thomas Durt [15]. The regions of the Bohm-Bub model [11] coincide with
our definition of the eigensets in the complex case (38). Moreover, Bohm and
Bub propose a uniform measure of states that they interpret as apparatus states.
They perform the integration directly for the two dimensional case, and indicate
the integration scheme can be extended to the more dimensional case. Their
result, like ours, is the reproduction of the Born rule. From the perspective of
this paper, Bayes-optimal observation yields an interpretation for the regions
employed by Bohm and Bub.
5 Concluding remarks
The search for a Bayesian or decision-theoretic framework for quantum probabil-
ity has recently been subject of a number of interesting publications ([13], [16],
[18], [24], [25], [27], [29], and [31]). One important motivation for seeking such
an interpretation, is that it allows for a subjective interpretation of quantum
probability by regarding the state vector as a mathematical representation of
the knowledge an agent has about a system. An often heard critique of Bayesian
interpretations of quantum probability is that, from a strictly Bayesian point of
view, the state vector represents the knowledge available to the agent that deals
with it. A majority of physicists rejects this notion, mainly because they feel
the relative frequencies obtained in actual experiments are objective features of
the system, and not of the knowledge of the agent. The Bayesian pragmatic
response to this, is that what can be inferred about a system always depends on
one’s prior knowledge of the system. However, in a theory that takes observation
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as a primitive concept, one cannot assume to have a priori knowledge. This is
what we have modelled here as the uniform distribution of initial observer states
and Bayes-optimal observation of an ensemble of identical states will then result
in an unbiased probability. If it is physically possible to obtain unbiased esti-
mates for a sufficient number of observables so that we can reconstruct the state
vector, then, at least in an operational sense, the state can be truly assigned
in an objective way to a system. Besides the objective informational content of
the state, the state may also represent an objective reality. This is in agreement
with the fact that we started from assumption (12); that the state is a realistic
description of the system, and it is the state of the system and the observer that
physically and deterministically interact to produce the measurement outcome.
Systems are in a state, and that state uniquely determines every possible inter-
action. The state vector truly represents complete information about a system,
but not merely as a collection of objective attributes, but as a representation
of the possible deterministic interactions with any other system, in particular
observing systems. A classically objective attribute, from this perspective, is
then the limiting case where the same result follows for the vast majority of
states of Bayes-optimal observing systems that the system can interact with.
The proposed interpretation is falsifiable in principle but there are obstacles
along the way. If we succeed in preparing the relevant degrees of freedom of
the states of the apparatus, we could produce a non-uniform distribution for the
initial states. Such a prepared apparatus would be able to distinguish some pairs
of states better, and some pairs of states worse than the usual Born rule allows,
which means it can only be used to our advantage if we posses some information
about the state prior to the measurement. It also means that the probability
for the occurrence of an outcome when we measure a mixture of states, depends
nonlinearly on the probabilities for each component of the mixture; a failure of
what we have called the “linear mixture property”. This would most likely lead
to a rejection of the validity of the apparatus by the majority of experimentalists.
And, we hope to have shown, in complete absence of prior information, it is not
evidently desirable to deviate from a complete lack of knowledge of the apparatus
state.
Perhaps there is another, still deeper, reason why it is not possible to com-
pletely control the state of the observer at the quantum level. The source of
probability in observation, the randomness in the state of the observer, may
very well at some point become fundamentally incontrollable. Logical argu-
ments seem to defend at least the possibility of such a thesis. In [12], it is
shown by an elegant construction, that for every observer there will be differ-
ent states of himself that he cannot distinguish. In [6] it is shown that, on
purely logical grounds, no observer can determine whether his observations are
entirely faithful13. It seems that, for every single measurement outcome, there
is a trade-off between the information an observer can choose to extract about
himself, and about the system he is observing. This trade-off can be quantified.
13To the best of our knowledge, the relation to such logical arguments and the quantum
measurement problem was pointed out for the first time in 1977 in a remarkable pioneering
paper by Dalla Chiara in [14].
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It is argued in [30] and [8] on thermodynamical grounds, that any gain in infor-
mation about a system is accompanied by an equal increase of entropy about
the state of the observing system. If this is indeed the underlying structure for
the occurrence of the quantum probabilistic structure, then the probabilities in
quantum mechanics are indeed ontic and epistemic at the same time. From an
absolute perspective, probability always arises because there is a lack of knowl-
edge situation; it is a measure over deterministic events. But to the one who
observes, this lack of knowledge may be fundamentally irreducable. It might
turn out that, after all, Einstein and Bohr were both right about the origin of
probabilities in quantum mechanics.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A
Lemma 6 If µ is a (probability) measure such that µ(∆n−1(X)) = 1, and Csk
is defined by the convex closure of (35), then we have µ([Csk]) = tk
Proof.
Let ρn−1 be the (not necessarily normalized) (n − 1) -Lebesgue measure in
∆n−1(X). Then we have
µ([Csk]) =
ρn−1([Csk])
ρn−1(∆n−1)
=
ρn−1([x1, . . . , xk−1,x(ψs), xk+1, . . . , xn])
ρn−1([x1, . . . , xn])
=
ρn−2 (B) d(B,x(ψs))
ρn−2 (B) d(B, xk)
In this last equation, B = [x1, . . . , xk−1, xk+1, . . . , xn] is the face shared by the
two simplices, and d(B, a) the smallest Euclidean distance between point a and
each point of face B, which is proportional to the norm of the orthogonal pro-
jection of a onto a unit vector b perpendicular to B. In Rn no unique vector is
perpendicular to B (which only has affine dimension n− 2), but as long as we
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stick to the same vector b for both simplices, the same constant of proportion-
ality will apply, and the ratio will eliminate that constant. Pick the xk base
vector as b, which is obviously unit-norm and perpendicular to B. The orthog-
onal projection of the top of Csk to b is: x(ψ
s) ↓ b = 〈x(ψs), xk〉xk = tkxk . For
∆n−1, the top is the vector xk itself and its projection xk ↓ b = 〈xk, xk〉xk = xk.
Hence we have
d(B,x(ψs))
d(B, xk)
=
||(x(ψs) ↓ b)||
||(xk ↓ b)||
= tkxk/xk = tk
6.2 Appendix B
Lemma 7 Let Csk be defined as in (35) and eig(xk,x(ψ
s)) by (31), then:
Csk ⊂ eig(xk,x(ψs)) ⊂ [Csk]
Proof. We start with the first inclusion. Suppose x(ψm) is in one of the
open (n − 1)−simplices Csk, then, by definition, there exist λi such that, with
0 < λi < 1,
∑
λi = 1,
x(ψm) =
n∑
i6=k
λixi + λkx(ψ
s) (46)
On the other hand we have that x(ψs) ∈ ∆n−1 and hence there exist tl ≥
0,
∑
tl = 1 such that (23) holds:
x(ψs) =
n∑
l=1
tlxl (47)
Substitution of (47) into (46) yields
x(ψm) = λktkxk +
n∑
i6=k
(λi + λkti)xi
Calculating the likelihood ratios (22), we obtain Λk =
1
λk
, and for i 6= k we
have:
Λi =
ti
λi + λkti
We easily see that Λk > Λi iff λi > 0, which is satisfied by assumption. Hence,
by (31) every x(ψm) ∈ Csk gives an outcome xk, establishing the result. For
the second inclusion, suppose there exists some x(ψm) ∈ ∆n−1 with x(ψm) /∈
[Csk]. The sets C
s
k in our theorem, as can be seen from the definition (35), are
disjoint open (n− 1)-simplices. If we had defined them by means of the closed
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convex closure, they would maximally share the (n − 2) simplex ∆sn−2(j, k) =
[x(ψs), x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xk−1, xk+1, . . . , xn] :
[Csj ] ∩ [Csk] = ∆sn−2(j, k)
Assume first a is not in the boundary of [Csk], i.e. not in one of the lower
dimensional sub-simplices ∆sn−2(j, k). Then x(ψ
m) ∈ Csi with i 6= k. Because of
the above demonstrated first inclusion we have x(ψm) ∈ eig
x(ψs)(xi) and hence
x(ψm) /∈ eig(xk,x(ψs)). If on the other hand x(ψm) ∈ ∆sn−2(j, k), our outcome
assignment on the basis of the maximum likelihood principle is ambiguous, as
there will be two equal maxima, and even more when x(ψm) is chosen in a
still lower dimensional subsimplex. However, we are free to choose whatever
outcome we like as long as it is one of the maxima. Because the maxima
coincide, these points lie in the boundary and hence the conclusion remains
eig(xk,x(ψ
s)) ⊂ [Csk].
6.3 Appendix C
Lemma 8 The mapping ω
ω : Sn → ∆n−1
ω(z) = (z1z
∗
1 , z2z
∗
2 , . . . , znz
∗
n)
is measure-preserving, i.e. for two measure spaces (∆n−1,B(∆n−1), µ) and
(Sn,B(Sn), ν) and A ∈ B(∆n−1) and ω−1(A) ∈ B(Sn), we have:
ν(ω−1(A)) =
2pin√
n
µ(A)
Proof. 14Let A be an arbitrary open convex set in ∆1 : A = {(x1, x2) : a <
x1 < b, x2 = 1− x1}. Evidently, µ(A) =
√
2(b − a). Let B be the pull-back of
A under ω :
B = {(z1, z2) ∈ Z1 × Z2 ⊂ C2 : Z1 = {z1 : a < |z1|2 < b},
Z2 = {z2 : z2 =
√
1− |z1|2eiθ, θ ∈ [0, 2pi[}}
Clearly,
ν(B) = ν(Z1)ν(Z2) = pi(b− a).2pi = 2pi
2
√
2
µ(A)
Hence the theorem holds for convex sets in ∆2. This conclusion can readily be
extended to an arbitrary (n− 1)-dimensional rectangle set A in ∆n−1 :
A = {(x1, . . . , xn−1, 1−
n−1∑
i=1
xi) : ∀i = 1, . . . , n− 1 : ai < xi < bi; ai, bi ∈ [0, 1]}
14This proof was first presented in [5], but we include it for completeness. The author is
grateful for a valuable hint from Wade Ramey that was helpful in proving the theorem.
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Its measure factorizes into:
µ(A) =
√
n
n−1∏
i=1
(bi − ai)
Next consider n-tuples of complex numbers:
B = {(z1, z2, . . . , zn) ∈ Z1 × . . .× Zn}
Zi = {zi ∈ C : ai < |zi|2 < bi, i 6= n},
zn =
√
1− |z1|2 − . . .− |zn−1|2eiθn , θn ∈ [0, 2pi[}}
Clearly ω(B) = A. The measure of B can be factorized as:
ν(B) = ν(Z1)ν(Z2) . . . ν(Zn)
= 2pi
n−1∏
i=1
pi(bi − ai) = 2pi
n
√
n
µ(A)
Hence the theorem holds for an arbitrary rectangle set A ⊂ ∆n−1. But every
open set in ∆n−1 can be written as a pair-wise disjoint countable union of
rectangular sets. It follows that ν(ω−1(·)) = 2pin√
n
µ(·) for all open sets in ∆n−1.
Both ν and µ are finite Borel measures because ∆n−1 and Sn are both compact
subsets of a vector space of countable dimension. Therefore they must be regular
measures ([26], p47), which are completely defined by their behavior on open
sets. Hence ω is measure preserving for Borel sets.
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